The International City Hypothesis:
An Approach to the Recent History of U. S. Cities
The last decades of the twentieth century have brought a new variation to American urban boosterism.
For more than 50 years, a benchmark for competitive success among American cities has been "big league" standing. Ambitious civic elites measure their ability to play in the metaphorical big leagues by their ability to attract major league sports teams. In the 1950s and 1960s, second-level cities on the fringes of the industrial belt such as Baltimore, Milwaukee and Minneapolis competed with booming sunbelt cities for peripatetic and expansion franchises in major league baseball, National Football League teams, and the somewhat junior National Basketball Association. Big league status, of course, reflects the size of metropolitan markets and relative standing within the national system of cities. 1 In the 1970s and particularly the 1980s, however, ambitious urban leaders also began to measure their cities against the ill-defined but even broader standard of the "world-class" or "world" city. 2 City after city advertises itself as a new international leader. Mayors have joined the jet set in search of special access to overseas markets and board rooms.
Cartographic boosters have revived "metro-centric" map projections that place their city at the center of the world. Ports have become "Worldports," development officials battle for direct air service to Seoul and Paris. The trade magazine for city managers and public works directors proclaims a new era of international competition and cosmopolitan cities. 3 The new rhetoric reflects some very real changes from the parochial nation of the 1950s, when a foreign tourist or business traveler was a rare event in the majority of was one foreign tourist for every twenty Americans. 4 These broad trends have had real and often startling results in one city after another.
Immigration has revitalized the ethnic communities of New York and Chicago, transformed
Miami and Los Angeles, and created new immigrant neighborhoods from Washington to San
Jose. Orlando and Honolulu annually play host to hundreds of thousands of overseas visitors. More than 40,000 residents of Greenville-Spartanburg work for European corporations. Seattle and its suburbs have signed more than thirty sister-city agreements with foreign cities and towns. 5 Dozens of cities and towns have protested national security policy by declaring nuclear free zones, divesting holdings in firms doing business in South Africa, or challenging immigration policy. 6 It is easier to sketch the globalization of American society and economic activity in broad outline than to describe in detail its effects on urban growth, urban systems, and urban life. As more and more Americans are directly involved with international flows of goods, people, money, and information, social scientists have struggled to adapt and update concepts and explanatory models that were originally developed for closed national or subnational economies. They have also begun to accumulate a narrow and unsystematic base of empirical data about local engagement with global systems. Both of these enterprises could benefit from greater involvement by urban historians. History offers a sceptical check on the "journalistic fallacy"--the tendency to believe that something must be new or different if we have just noticed it. Its concern with the effects of individual decisions and decisionmakers offers a potential for correcting or corroborating sweeping theories. Its attention to the detail of specific cases can help to build the necessary base of information. This essay is an attempt to encourage urban historians to participate in these efforts.
The first section section summarizss and evaluates theoretical frameworks for understanding the internationalization of urban America. It reviews competing models that sociologists, geographers, and urban planners have developed for understanding the transnational sources of urban growth. With an eye to the historical dimension, I suggest several reasons to utilize a looser and more inclusive concept of "international city" in addition to the tighter and narrower category of "world city." The section concludes with a tentative typology of international cities that can be used in both case studies and comparative analysis. The second section offers preliminary ideas about the patterns, processes, and policies involved in the internationalization of American cities. I discuss problems in measuring the extent of a city's international engagement and propose possible indicators. I then suggest some typical sequences or pathways of international development and raise a series of questions about the ways in which local policy has responded to the networking of the world economy.
Social scientists interested in world urbanization and economic change have developed two broad models for understanding the transnational urban systems found at the end of the twentieth century. The more fully developed approach can be termed the "world city" model. It emphasizes hierarchical relationships among cities and argues that a very limited set of hegemonic cities now dominate economic decision-making on a global scale.
An alternative "international city" model stresses the variety of roles and functions that cities can play within complex networks of global exchange. In the great social science divide between advocates of "structure" and advocates of "agency," the world city model is essentially structuralist; it presents world cities as the logical outgrowth of worldwide economic change. The international city model is much more open to the possibility that human actions and public policies may have differential effects.
The roots of the "world city" terminology have been traced to the end of the eighteenth century, when J. F. Goethe described Rome and Paris as weltstadte. 7 Both German and English writers used the term in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries to capture the expanding scale and international reach of the economic and imperial capitals of industrial Europe. London, for example, was "the centre of the world" to a commentator in 1862, the "world's metropolis" in the 1880s, and "the city of the world" in 1841 and 1912. Americans in the mid-century decades argued that the future "world-city" would be located not on the As is often the case, the term and its variants of "global city" and "world-class city"
have moved quickly from scholarly hypothesis to catchword, dropped into titles in the same way that "sunbelt" was used in the late 1970s and early 1980s. Most commonly, however, the Geddes-Hall terminology has been appropriated for a hierarchical model of the world economy that posits a single imposed system of metropolitan control from core to periphery.
This view was clearly stated by John Friedmann, whose concern was to explain "the contemporary system of global capital accumulation and its spatial articulation through a system of 'world cities'." 10 The world city model assumes that peripheral cities have limited "free will." Their roles are imposed by the political and economic power of the dominant world city or cities, exercised through the structures of international finance and multinational corporations.
Secondary cities are interpreted in terms of their function within a nested hierarchy. Joe
Feagin and Michael Peter Smith thus talk about world cities, regional-international cities, and regional-national cities. Nigel Thrift talks about global centers, zonal centers, and regional centers. John Friedmann talks about primary and secondary cities. 13 Within this scheme of analysis, peripheral or subordinate cities are credited with little opportunity for independent initiatives or lateral connections to their peers in other countries.
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In one sense, the world city model is an effort to globalize central place theory.
Global cities like New York, to use the title of Robert Beauregards's edited collection, stand "atop the urban hierarchy." 15 They share all of the functions and activities of less important cities and they simultaneously house specialized activities that are found nowhere else. The bankers of the City of London and the art dealers of New York both offer services so specialized that they require the entire world as a market.
The model also has conceptual links to dependency theory as applied to developing nations, understanding primate cities and new industrial centers in such countries as recipients of orders from London, Tokyo, Paris, and New York. 16 Anthony King, for example has studied the ways in which colonial cities were "instrumental in creating the space in which today's capitalist world-economy operates" by introducing western values, capitalist business organization, and industrialized systems of production. 17 The idea of world cities thus identifies and describes a mechanism or channel for hierarchical control by adapting mercantile models of urban growth to a world scale. specialization. The result is presumably a system in which the dispersal of production has supported global industrialization but in which control continues to be concentrated in a short list of key cities scattered across the globe. 19 Historians may recognize that the idea of hegemonic world cities is not as new as some of its advocates might believe. The model draws on the work of scholars like Ferdinand
Braudel and Jan De Vries. 20 It finds a detailed expression in the World-System theory of Immanuel Wallerstein, who describes the evolution of European capitalism since the sixteenth century in terms of shifting relationships between a dominant "metropolis" or economic core and a periphery that is subordinated through political control and unequal economic exchanges. 21 Historians and historical sociologists such as Janet Abu-Lughod and
Christopher Chase-Dunn use the world-system model to examine changes over time in the leadership of the global hierarchy of cities. Thinking in large and structural terms, they tend to see the twentieth century as expanding the scale of the world-economy but not necessarily changing its character. 22 Like the world city model, the alternative international city model starts from an interest in the role of cities in articulating the global operation of markets. More specifically, however, it finds that interurban competition sorts out a much more complex system of commercial centers and specialized cities on a world scale. Such cities pursue their international roles and interact within networks that may cross-link hierarchically organized regions and directly connect middle-sized cities without the intervention of the world capitals. The contrasting characteristics of the two models are summarized in Table 1 .
The international city model lies squarely in the tradition of ecological sociology.
Indeed, an early version was sketched sixty-five years ago by sociologist Roderick
McKenzie. Teaching in Seattle and thinking about the economic emergence of Japan and the Orient, McKenzie noted the simultaneous growth of new urban "centers of gravity" and the prominence of "routes, rather than rims"--that is, the increasing complexity of multi-lateral exchanges across national or regional borders. He also commented on the way in which "the annihilation of space by modern means of communication has given to individual cities or chains of cities specialized roles as collectors and distributors of different kinds of information," citing commodities futures markets in Winnipeg and New Orleans. 23 Where the world city model focuses on control activities, the international city model also The international city model thus opens the door to a series of specific historical questions, for it assumes that cities can pursue and compete for a variety of economic functions. 32 Like studies of internal urban rivalries, it allows a role for the contingencies of local policy and initiative. Historians might examine the content and results of urban efforts to promote international functions and presence. They might evaluate whether public and private members of urban growth coalitions have treated globalization as a problem or an opportunity. They might ask whether there are distinctive variations among internationallyoriented policy responses from city to city.
The openness to questions of history and policy is a substantial contrast with the the world city model, which gives little attention to the detailed processes of historical change as they operate at the scale of an individual city. Indeed, the historian of the United States finds little immediate help in the sweeping idea of hegemonic world cities, for New York is our only sure example and Los Angeles our only other probable candidate. With its focus on the very largest cities and on their interaction with peripheral and/or colonial cities, the model is an excellent tool for understanding multiple functions of cities like New York and Tokyo.
However, it has little interest in supporting-cast cities within the economic core or in the process of evolution from semiperiphery to core.
In broad comparison, the two approaches fall on opposite sides of the modern/post-modern metaphor. The world city model is hierarchical, structured, and inclusive, understanding all cities as parts of a unitary system. Its underlying interest is the distribution of power. The international city model emphasizes lateral connections and networks as well a hierarchies, the contingency of economic and political history, and the possibility of flexible adaptation. Its underlying interest is in the variety of activities, both important and mundane.
In judging the applicability of the two models, it is a reasonable hypothesis that the travel and communication revolutions of the past generation have helped to shift the United States and the wider world from a hierarchical to a networked pattern. The underlying principle of this hypothesis, drawn from the basic theory of economic development, is that expanding social and economic systems involve increased specialization. The suggestion that we are moving to a more complex model with network connections does not require that corporate and financial control be deconcentrated. New York, London, and Tokyo remain extraordinarily vital as world centers. However, such a hierarchy of global capitalism is more and more deeply embedded in multilateral exchanges involving urban specialization.
Such lateral ties are particularly relevant for understanding the second-level cities that the world city model treats as passive intermediaries between the economic capitals and the centers of production.
The network model also recognizes the obvious variety among cities in advanced economies by making room for at least three types of international cities. Building on the standard typologies of cities within domestic economies, analysts have suggested a variety of ways to categorize international cities. Several of these typologies are summarized in Table   2 and grouped into the three general categories of production, gateway, and transactional cities. By recognizing the variety of roles among late twentieth-century cities, the categories provide a way to organize detailed information about the evolution of international cities that is lacking in the unity world city model. 33 International production cities are manufacturing cities that directly serve world markets by exporting finished goods, production expertise, and branch plants. Obvious examples are nineteenth century Manchester and twentieth century Detroit. The international role of American production cities has increased since 1960 because of the rising importance of world trade for the United States and because the shift of production to other countries has necessitated coordination across borders. Their international management and information activities tend to be in direct support of their production sector.
Gateway cities were historically the entry points to European overseas settlement regions or colonies--both the commercial cities so central to the urban history of the United States and the colonial cities of nineteenth century European expansion. In these roles they were avenues of cultural as well as economic penetration. Within the United States they connected the northeastern industrial core with southern and western resource regions. 34 In the twentieth century they have functioned as access points to resource regions and regional markets. The economy of the later twentieth century has added new types of exchanges to their historic flows of goods and immigrants.
International transactional cities, to use the terminology of Jean Gottmann, are the suppliers of professional expertise, financial services, and personal services to multi-national markets. This is the sector that has attracted the greatest attention of the "urban transformationists" who take the position that the 1970s ushered in a new world urban system. Transactional cities may specialize in economic information, political/organizational information, or cultural information. 35 The international city model for United States cities will remain a hypothesis until adequately tested. We need systematic quantitative data to analyze and compare international roles among second and third level cities as well as among the acknowledged world cities. We also need studies of individual cities that examine the processes by which international functions have grown, including the roles of public and private development strategies and policies.
Most rankings or measurements of the global connections of cities concentrate on the banking, finance, and corporate sectors that are central to the world city hypothesis. As late as early 1990s, writers were still utilizing the limited data on corporate sales and advanced services that R. B. Cohen generated in the mid-1970s. 36 In fact, it is easy to propose a score of additional indicators (Table 3 ). Some reflect a city's general orientation, others particular types of international relationships. 37 The list includes standard economic data like imports and exports and "softer" indicators, such as telephone listings, that may express community attitudes. Particularly difficult to measure are the "invisible earnings" of service industries, which are poorly and unsystematically reported. We have virtually no data on the interregional and international sales of services by metropolitan area to match data on shipments of tangible commodities. Because economists began to give serious attention to services only in the 1970s, the problem is particularly troublesome for historical studies. A special challenge is to supplement cross-sectional comparisons with measures of change over time. Using six categories, including some that were "eyeballed" from the secondary literature, I have found that that international roles among large southern and western cities increased most dramatically from the early 1960s to late 1980s in Los Angeles, Miami, Washington, Dallas, and Atlanta. 40 In contrast, Denver, San Antonio, Nashville, Tampa, and a dozen other cities showed limited growth of international roles relative to national trends. Given the thinness of the data, these results are hypotheses rather than conclusions. They can, however, be a starting point for questions about the differential effects of regional location, economic base, position within the national urban hierarchy on the progress of internationalization.
It is also necessary to analyze specific cases within the broad patterns. Detailed studies of individual cities might include questions about typical pathways or sequences of international engagement, about the content and effect of local policy, and about the sources of local support and opposition to international strategies. Here too, we know more about the world cities of New York and Los Angeles than about increasinly internationalized cities like Washington or Atlanta. Indeed, New York's recovery from the verge of financial collapse in the 1970s and its economic vitality in the 1980s has been one of the chief exhibits on behalf of the world city argument. Several prominent studies have recognized New York's special importance by focusing on the ways in which that city has made space for the new functions that it has received because of world economic changes. 41 Scholars have similarly examined
Los Angeles for the effects of global economic change on local geography, planning, and politics. 42 In both cases, the growth of world city functions is presented as compatible with traditional growth coalition strategies that are oriented to the value of urban core real estate.
Few theoretically sophisticated and detailed case studies are available for other American cities. 43 Sociologist Joe Feagin has written about the international connections of Houston and political scientist Richard Child Hill about Detroit. 44 Continuning an interest in the changing character of the putative Sunbelt, I have supplemented quantitative comparisons with preliminary looks at a number of southern and western cities. Case studies with an explicit historical dimension tentatively suggest that the development of international cities has followed two distinct sequences or pathways.
In the more straightforward sequence, a city builds an international presence directly on its domestic strength as producer, gateway, or information center. Houston and Detroit export not only petroleum products and automobiles but also on relevant production expertise--oil field equipment and drilling supplies in the one case, software and robotics for manufacturing processes in the other. Houston's numerous foreign banks directly serve its international petrochemical business. 45 Dallas and Atlanta have capitalized on their roles as gateways to large segments of the American domestic market. Foreign businesses have found it convenient to utilize their hub airports, railroads, interstate highways, wholesaling systems, regional banks, and business services. 46 In contrast, Washington's role as an international information center is constructed directly on its historic function as a national This essay has argued that we add little to our understanding of most United States cities by asking a yes/no question about world class status. The answer--almost surely negative--is likely to cut off rather than invites further investigation. There is, however, much to be learned from studying the variety of international city types and functions.
Where world city theory is interested in the locus of economic control and the identity of the world's most important places, the international city hypothesis directs attention to the local impacts of structural economic change, the character and supporters of local initiatives, and the range of international connections that different cities have developed.
The specific comparisons and examples in the foregoing discussion are an open invitation to further research on these multiple international dimensions of urban growth.
Compared with specialists on European or even Canadian cities, American urbanists have just begun to explore a promising list of questions. 51 Several needs stand out. One is the further development of comparative and time series data. Another is case studies of economic development strategies that cover the entire postwar period and that look for opposition and conflict as well as support for internationalization. A third need is for analysis that further defines the common sequences and linkages among different international roles and further refines a useful typology of international cities. As we pursue this agenda, American urban specialists will be taking an important step in building a comparative history that recognizes the variety of our urban experience. Table 2 City Type or Specialization 
